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ARGUMENT 
What is established at this point is that each of the three Appellants/Plaintiffs received 
emails soliciting products to be sold by the Defendant/Appellee/Redmond. S e e 
GaiTiott Ct. Rec. p. 140. Redmond admittedly contracts with third parties to solicit their 
products. See Garriott Ct. Rec. p. 43. It is not a great jump to conclude that Redmond 
actually did contract with the senders of the emails, or in other words that they in fact caused 
them to be sent. That is their business and they way they market it. The only contradiction 
to that conclusion is the affidavit of the Redmond CEO, who has never been cross-
examined. Without appropriate discovery it is impossible to know if that affidavit speaks 
the truth or is merely self-serving. Plaintiffs could not possibly obtain the details of the 
arrangements between Redmond and its "independent contractors" without being permitted 
to take discovery. It was error for the lower court to proceed to judgment based upon the 
limited information it had. 
I. Independent Contractor Tort Theory Does Not Apply Because of the 
Clear Provisions of the Statute. 
The issue at this point is not whether or not the entities who actually pushed the 'send 
button' to send the Plaintiffs these offending emails are employees or independent 
contractors to Redmond. Rather it is whether or not Redmond caused the offending emails 
to be sent. Because if Redmond did cause the emails to be sent, the statute imposes liability 
upon them. And it is a statute we are dealing with here. 
1 
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By their own admission, Redmond does hire entities such as those who sent these 
emails to advertise their products. Redmond then pays these entities a commission on the 
sales of Redmond products. Further, Redmond provides to these entities ready made 
creatives for email campaigns. In other words, Redmond creates email advertisements and 
hires entities to send them out for them. They are the driving force behind the sending of 
the emails. They want them to be sent, hire people to send them, and cause them to be sent. 
Appellee attempts to make this result seems absurd by the use of a scenario in which 
Kellogg's would be responsible for the emails soliciting Corn Flakes sent by a grocery 
store.1 That scenario does not fit, unless a qualifier is added that Kellogg's doesn't just sell 
their product to the grocery store for resale, but rather hires the grocery store to send out 
emails advertising their Corn Flakes, which cannot be purchased at the grocery store, but 
which can only be purchased at Kellogg's. Which is what happened in this case. In this 
case, Redmond hires promoters to send out their emails. No evidence was submitted that 
Redmond sells its product to others who can then resell their product. Rather, Redmond 
specifically hires promoters to solicit sales for their products, which are purchased from 
Redmond, not the "grocery store." 
1
 Redmond's actions are more like a mob boss who hires and pays a hit man to 
knock off some other person. The mob boss may not have actually killed the victim, but 
certainly would be guilty of a crime for paying (causing) someone else to do his dirty 
work. 
2 
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The implication behind this arrangement is that Redmond causes emails to be sent by 
paying people to set up and send out email campaigns advertising their products. This fits 
squarely within the parameters of the statute. Section 13-26-103 of the Utah Code places 
strict liability upon anyone who "sends or causes to be sent" an unsolicited commercial 
email without following certain requirements of the statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-36-
103 (1953 as amended). Each of the Plaintiffs/Appellants in this case received an email 
which was not in compliance with the statute. Those facts are not in dispute, and are direct 
findings of the lower court. See Garriott Ct. Rec. p. 140, ff 6-8. What is in dispute is 
whether or not the entity that caused the SPAM to be sent should be held responsible for it, 
as the statute requires. The key phrase in the statute is "sends or causes to be sent." There 
is no qualification. If an entity sends or causes an email to be sent that violates the statute, 
they are liable. Redmond caused the SPAM to be sent. 
Redmond misses the point with it's extended arguments regarding independent 
contractors. One of the very reasons why the lower court erred in its decision, was based 
upon this flawed argument. Redmond's argument surrounding independent contractors is 
based upon the general common law rule that "the employer of an independent contractor 
is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or 
his servants." Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, f 13, 979 P.2d 322, 325 (Utah 1999). The 
violation before the court however, was not physical or tortious harm, rather, it was a 
statutory violation, and the statute is quite clear. Section 13-26-103 of the Utah Code places 
3 
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strict liability upon anyone who "sends or causes to be sent" an unsolicited commercial 
email without following certain requirements of the statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-36-
103 (1953 as amended) (Emphasis added). There really is no need to go beyond the statute 
to make that determination. 
II. Even If Independent Contractor Theory Does Apply, There Are Too 
Many Factual Disputes to Make a Finding of Summary Judgment. 
Even should this Court agree that independent contractor theory does apply, there are 
exceptions to the general rule. Those exceptions require an extensive examination of the 
facts surrounding the situation. Such examination was not made and can not be made in this 
case, because of the lack of discovery and the lack of actual facts available to the lower 
court. Nevertheless a review of at least several of the exceptions to the general rule also 
demonstrates Redmond's liability. 
A first exception to the general rule that "a principal employer is not subject to 
liability for injuries arising out of its contractor's work revolves around the participation of 
the employer in the performance of the work. If the employer "actively participates" in the 
performance of the work they will be held responsible. For instance, in Simon v. Deery Oil, 
699 F. Supp. 257, 258 (D. Utah 1988), the court held for the proposition that a principal 
employer "retaining an independent contractor to render services has no duty to warn or train 
employees of the contractor, nor must the principal protect the contractor's employees from 
the contractor's own negligence, unless the principal has 'actively participated' in the 
project." See also Sewell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 606 F.2d 274,276 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. 
4 
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denied, 444 U.S. 1080 (1980); Texaco, Inc. v. Pruitt, 396 F.2d 237, 240 (10th Cir. 1968); 
Erwin v. Kern River Gas Transmission Co., 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 6685, *8 (addressing 
Utah law on issue). 
The comments to section 414 of the Restatement provide guidance as to the "active 
participation" requirement: "In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply, the employer 
must have retained at least some degree of control over the manner in which the work is 
done. It is not enough that he has merely a general right to order the work stopped or 
resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make suggestions or 
recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations and 
deviations. Such a general right is usually reserved to employers, but it does not mean that 
the contractor is controlled as to his methods of work, or as to operative detail." See 
Thompson at 327 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 cmt. c. (1965) (emphasis 
added). 
In this case, it is unclear what control Redmond maintains. There has been no 
discovery to determine that. That is a factual determination creating a genuine issue for 
which summary judgment was not appropriate. 
A second exception applicable to this situation is stated in Gleason v. Salt Lake City, 
et al, 94 Utah 1,74 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1937). "[Wjhere the injury was the direct result of the 
stipulated work." (Citing 1 Labatt's Master & Servant, 2d Ed., 127). Which in this case 
appears to be exactly the situation as whether the entities were independent contractors or 
5 
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employees, they were hired to send out solicitous emails, which the actually did. The 
sending of the emails caused the injuries, which were the direct result of the agreed upon 
work. Once again, Redmond is not relieved of its liability for causing the offending emails 
to be sent. 
III. There Are at Least Two Versions of Redmond's Anti-Spam Policy. 
Redmond supplied two different versions of their alleged "Anti-Spam Policy." The 
second of which, the one supplied to the lower court, conveniently contains all the same 
provisions and requirements of the Utah Spam statute. The first does not. Discovery should 
be allowed to determine, first of all, which policy is actually in place (if any) and second of 
all, if or how either of those policies is actually implemented (if they were). The only 
information we have available is that there are SPAM policies which Redmond alleges it 
causes each of it's promoters to agree to, but yet we have three obvious examples of non 
conformance to either the alleged policies or the Utah Spam statute. Something does not sit 
right and that can only be explained through further discovery. 
IV. Appellant's Motion for Discovery under Rule 56(f) Should Have Been 
Granted. 
Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: 
"Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he 
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just." 
6 
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The Utah Supreme Court has held on "numerous occasions that rule 56(f) motions 
opposing a summary judgment motion on the ground that discovery has not been completed 
should be granted liberally unless they are deemed dilatory or lacking in merit." Salt Lake 
County v. Western Dairymen Coop, 48 P.3d 910 (Utah 2002) (citing Price Dev. Co. v. Orem 
City, 995 P.2d 1237 (Utah 2000); CrosslandSav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1994); and 
Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984)). 
In this case, Redmond's Motion for Summary Judgment was made and filed in 
February, 2003, discovery was not completed, in fact the process was never allowed to 
begin. See Garriott Ct. Rec. p. 34-50. There were no interrogatories, no requests for 
admission, no requests for production, no depositions. There was never any opportunity to 
conduct such discovery. This was not for lack of interest, or for dilatory tactics, there simply 
was not enough time to conduct them before Redmond's motion was made. These methods 
are necessary to flush out the facts and to determine plaintiff's claims on the merits, not on 
the pleadings. The Plaintiff made claims and the Defendant made its own claims in 
opposition creating a situation of "he said, she said." There was no flushing out of the facts, 
for none was allowed by the lower court. 
Discovery would have allowed the parties to determine several material facts, and 
cross-examine Redmond on their differing assertions, including whether or not Redmond 
actually did or does comply with an anti-SPAM policy, and if it does, which one it complies 
with. Furthermore, as stated by the lower court, "notably absent from the affidavit is a 
7 
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direct, categorical statement that [the] senders are not now, nor have they ever been RedV 
Promoters or employees." SeeGarriottCt. Rec. p. 144,c|[22. Because so much of the lower 
court's decision was based upon the affidavits of the parties, the discovery process would 
be used to verify or contradict the testimony actually submitted. Because there was no 
discovery, there was no opportunity to cross-examine either party's assertions. 
Plaintiffs motion was submitted in a timely fashion, with pertinent rationale and 
necessity. Notwithstanding that and the Utah Supreme Court's many findings that Rule 
56(f) motions should be granted liberally, in this case, it was not. Appellant respectfully 
requests this Court correct the lower court's error by remanding this matter for further 
discovery and determination. 
CONCLUSION 
The fundamental issue in this case is not the vicarious liability of a principal as 
Redmond suggests, rather it is whether or not this Court or the court below should enforce 
the clear terms of a statute implemented by this state's legislature. It is eminently clear that 
the statute imposes liability on parties that either send or cause to be sent offending emails. 
If Redmond didn't sent the emails, they certainly caused them to be sent. They should be 
held liable under the statute. It was error to find summary judgment in their favor, that error 
should be reversed. 
8 
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Further, discovery was essential before making the factual determinations below. 
Discovery was prohibited, in violation of the Rules. Summary Judgment was not 
appropriate. 
DATED this 2L day of May, 2004. 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Attorney for Appellant 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL, via first class mail, postage prepaid, 
on the following: 
John A. Pearce 
Christian D. Austin 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
170 South Main St., Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
on this 7,1 day of May, 2004. 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
